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By Andrew F. Brimmer
A general consensus hasemerged among
most economic forecasters with respect
to expectations about prospects for the
American economy during 1978.Most ob-
servers now anticipate only a modest
rebound from last year's sluggish pace of
economic activity over the next two quar-
ters, followed by a marked slowing in the
second half of the year.On the other hand,
opinions differ significantly over the de-
gree to which economic policies of the
Federal Government should be modified
in the near future to offset the prospective
slow-down.
The shape of the consensus regarding
the contours of economic activity through
the end of 1978 can be traced in a num-
ber of forecasts. The one followed in this
presentation was prepared by Data Re-
sources, Inc. (DRI). Several elements in
the latest DRI forecast (made at the end
of October) are summarized in Table A.
Also, some of the key components of a
forecast for 1978 made by the Business
Council are shown in the table.
A moderation is anticipated this year in
the overall rate of nationaleconomic ex-
pansion between January and June-a
period during which the real gross na-
tional product (GNP)may rise by 4.4 per-
cent (seasonally adjusted annual rate-
SAAR). But in the third quarter, the rate
may ease to 4.0 percent-and further to
3.4 percent in the final quarter. For the
two quarters combined, the rate of growth
may average 3.6 percent. For t~ year as
a whole, real GNP may increase by about
4.3 percent.
If the rate of increase in real GNP does
fall to the neighborhood of 3V2 percent in
the second half of 1978, the nation would
probably experience what economists
call a "growth recession." This means,
the actual rate of expansion would be too
low to prevent unemployment from rising.
A figure close to 4 percent is required to
achieve that result.
All of the major sectors of the economy
(except state and local governments) are
forecast by DRI to register lower real
growth rates in 1978, when compared
with 1977. For example, total consumer
spending, 3.9 percent vs. 4.4 percent;
business fixed investment, 6.0 percent vs.
8.8 percent; Federal Govemment, 4.7 per-
cent vs. 6.3 percent; and state and local
govemment 4.7 percent vs. 1.3percent.
Business Fixed Investment
It is the outlook for business fixed invest-
ment that is causing the most uncertainty.
Trends in this sector suggest a modest
strength throughout 1978. For 1977, the
gain was approximately 8.8 percent in
real terms. For the three quarters ending
in December, the rate of increase was
forecast to average approximately 5.8
percent, with a fairly large proportion of
the rise reflecting outlays for equipment
rather than construction of plants and
other faci Iities.
For 1978, according to preliminary re-
sults in McGraw-Hill's annual fall survey
of spending plans released late in 1977,
businessmen may lift outlays for plant
and equipment by only 3 percent in real
terms during 1978. And capital expendi-
tures may total approximately $153.1 bi I-
lion-a gain of about 11 percent over
1977. However, prices of capital goods
may climb by 8 percent in 1978, holding
the rise to 3 percent in real terms.
As shown in Table A, DRI and the Busi-
ness Council are forecasting somewhat
higher growth rates for 1978-6.0 percent
and 7.5 percent, respectively. Neverthe-
less, it seems highly unlikely that this
sector will achieve the goal set by the
Carter Administration, which calls for
business fixed investment to rise at an
annual average pace of 9 to 10 percent
through 1981.On the basis of current poli-
cies, it appears that the growth rate may
average no more than 7 percent.
One reason for the short-fall in invest- .
ment is the uncertainty on the part of
businessmen regarding the outlook for
sales. In the corporate sector, a substan-
tial volume of new investment outlays has
been approved, but funds have not been
~propriated The explanation is straight-
ard: considerable doubt exists about
strength of demand at the time the
ut from expanded facilities reaches
market. In the meantime, the rate of
m on the existing capital stock (cor-
ted for inflation) remains low by his-
- ical standards. As a consequence, the
::: ectors of many companies are restrain-
new investment unti I increased de-
-;and lifts profit margins.
It is against this background that a
-:.rmber of business leaders have called
- a sizable tax reduction in 1978, with a
- nificant portion designed to stimulate
:<:pita I formation.
spects for Jobs
e consequence of the slower pace of
nomic activity would be a further re-
=JCtion in the rate of unemployment dur-
1978. This rate stuck in the neighbor-
-:ood of 7 percent during the last half of
- 77. Therefore, the jobless rate may still
-;:main around 6.5 percent by the end of
-,' year. Among some of the groups on
margins of the economy (such as
~ cks and teenagers), proportionately
3SS improvement is anticipated.
There were 91,339 thousand persons
=: work in the United States in October
:=. 6,897 thousand were unemployed.
latter figure represents 7.0 percent
z: the civilian labor force, which totaled
236 thousand. Several features of these
:::ala note the differential positions of
~ cks and young people.
hile Blacks constitute 11.6 percent of
civilian labor force and held 10.7 per-
t of the jobs, they accounted for 22.8
cent of total unemployment. At 13.9
cent, Blacks' unemployment rate was
~8 times the 6.1 percent recorded for
ites. Teenagers of all races represent
- percent of the labor force and held 8.5
cent of the jobs, but they accounted
=- 23.4 percent of unemployment. The
less rate was 17.3 percent for teen-
::gers as a group and 37.9 percent for
~ cks alone in 1977.
The figures in Table B illustrate even
more dramatically the differential job ex-
perience of Black and white workers in
recent years. In general, during the 1973-
75 recession, Blacks had to bear a dis-
proportionate share of the burden of in-
creased unemployment. Moreover, during
the last 30 months of the recovery, they
have gotten a small fraction of the added
jobs, compared with their relative posi-
tion in the labor market. Over the same
period, the level of unemployment among
Blacks has risen significantly. For ex-
ample, from March 1975 through October
1977, the total labor force rose by 6,355
thousand, and the Black component
climbed by 1,045 thousand. Thus, Blacks
accounted for 16.4 percent of the total
expansion. However, jobs held by Blacks
rose by on Iy 869 thousand and repre-
sented 11.6 percent of the increase in
total employment. As a result, the level of
unemployment among Blacks rose by 149
thousand - compared with ad rop of 1,014
thousand among whites and 865 thou-
sand in the economy as a whole.
If the overall unemployment rate is
about 6.5 percent at the end of 1978, the
rate for Blacks may still be in the neigh-
borhood of 13 percent; for whites about
5.7 percent. Thus, the historical Black-
white ratio of more than 2 to 1 would still
prevail.
These data illustrate once again the im-
portance of vigorous economic expansion
as an underpinning for increased employ-
ment opportunities for those on the margin
of society. While job training and other
specialized programs are clearly needed,
a sustained, high level of real economic
growth is a necessary foundation for the
expansion of jobs for the disadvantaged.
Outlook for Inflation
The general price level has been rising
at a trend rate of 6 percent for quite a
while. Fluctuations around the trend (as-
sociated mainly with variations in food
prices) have dampened or boosted the
rate compared with the basic trend for a
few months. But the hard core rate of in-
flation appears to be lodged in the neigh-
borhood of 6 percent.
The jump in the wholesale price index 9
(WPI) last October by 0.8 percent illus-
trates the pattem. Most of that rise can be
traced to significant advances in prices
of farm products and processed foods
and feeds. Prices of farm products alone
rose at an annual rate of 28.8 percent. In
the preceding five consecutive months,
these prices had dectrned.
In 1978, one should expect little change
in the pace of inflation. In its latest fore-
cast, DRI estimated that the consumer
price index (CPI) may rise by 6.0 percent,
compared with 6.5 percent in 1977. (See
Table A). The Business Council forecast a
6.2 percent rate of inflation during 1978.
If one were to measure the pace of infla-
tion by the GNP deflator, the rate of in-
crease may amount to 5.9 percent this
year vs. 5.6 percent in 1977.
A key point to keep in mind is this: the
prospective pace of inflation at least
through 1978 (and perhaps for a year or
so beyond) is not a reflection of excess
demand. It cannot be traced to "too much
money chasing too few goods." Instead,
it is a reflection of a number of other
factors, including higher costs stemming
from rises in labor costs in excess of
gains in productivity and sharply higher
fuel prices. In the economy as a whole,
uti lization rates in manufacturing (ap-
proximately 83 percent) are well below
capacity-even if the latter is discounted
for marginal facilities. This situation is not
likely to change very much over the com-
ing months:
Outlook for Monetary Policy
Turning to monetary policy, it is evident
that the Federal Reserve System is caught
in a serious dilemma: it is faced with a
choice between pressing its commitment
to check what it sees as excessive rates
of monetary growth and providing the
money and credit needed to enhance the
prospects of sustained economic ,ex-
pansion.
As can be seen from Table C, the nar-
rowly defined money supply, Ml (consist-
ing of checking accounts and currency
10 in the hands of the public) grew by 8.8
percent (SAAR)during the month ending
October 19,1977. For the 8-week period,
the rate was 10.2 percent, and it was 9.2
percent over the previous three months.
The six-month rate was 8.9 percent. The
long-term growth rate (52-weeks) was 7.7
percent.
For the more broadly defined money
supply, M2 (consisting of Ml plus bank
time and savings deposits other than
large negotiable certificates of deposit),
the pattern of growth was as follows: Oc-
tober, 8.4 percent; 8-weeks 8.9 percent;
three months, 8.9 percent; 26-weeks, 9.3
percent, and 52-weeks, 10.4 percent.
These growth rates are well above the
targets set by the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC).The latest announced
targets are (percent):
Category 1977:2 to 1978:2





The growth in the monetary aggregates
above the Federal Reserve's upper limit
occurred in two sharp spurts centering in
April-May and late-July-rnid-September.
In April, M 1 rose by 19.4 percent (SAAR)
and in July-September 15.6 percent.
To curb the rapid rise in the money
supply last spring, the FOMC lifted the
federal funds rate from an average of 4.60
percent in the week ending April 6 to 5.45
percent in the week ending May 25. In
response to this move, the rate of growth
for M 1 eased off from 9.8 percent (SAAR)
in the second week of May to 7.8 percent
in late July. However, the growth rate took
another large jump to 11.4percent in mid-
September. To counter the second ad-
vance, the FOMC through restraint on
bank reserves, raised the federal funds
rate from an average of 5.42 percent in
July to 6.56 percent in the week ending
October 26.
Many market participants seem to be-
lieve that the FOMC has a target of 6.5
percent for the federal funds rate. A few
think the FOMC is prepared to see the
rate move as high as 6.75 percent- if
Period Real Business Inflation
(Year and Fixed (Consumer Unemployment Rate
Quarter) Real GNP Investment Price Index) (Percent)3
DRI' BC' DRI BC DRI BC DRI BC
1976 6.0 6.0 3.6 3.6 5.7 5.7 7.7 7.7
1977 4.8 5.0 8.8 9.0 6.5 6.5 7.1 7.0
I 7.5 7.5 19.0 19.0 8.4 8.4 7.4 7.4
" 6.1 6.1 6.9 6.9 8.8 8.8 7.0 7.0
'"
3.8 4.2 5.3 7.0 7.0
IV 4.2 6.2 4.8 6.9
1978 4.3 4.5 6.0 7.5 6.0 6.5
I 4.6 4.7 6.3 6.6
" 4.2 6.6 6.4 6.5
'"
4.0 8.2 6.0 6.5
IV 3.4 6.1 5.8 6.2 6.5 6.6
Notes:
1 Data Resources. Inc.
2 Business Council
J Percent of Civilian Labor Force
Table B.
Changes in the Civilian Labor Force, Employment, and
Unemployment, By color, March 1975-0ctober 1977
(Number in Thousands)
.Change: March, 1975,
Category March, 1975 October, 1977 October, 1977
Total
Civilian Labor Force 91,881 98,236 6.355
Employment 84,119 91,339 7,720
Unemployment 7,762 6,897 -865
White
Civilian Labor Force 81,551 86,861 5,310
Employment 75,216 81,540 6,324
Unemployment 6,335 5,321 -1.014
Black
Civilian Labor Force 10,330 11,375 1,045
Employment 8,903 9,799 896
Unemployment 1.427 1.576 149
Black As Percent of Total
Civilian Labor Force 11.2 11.6 16.4
Employment 10.6 10.7 11.6
Unemployment 18.4 22.9 -17.2
Source' Calculated by Brirrsner & Co.. Inc. from U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Data.
necessary to bring the growth of themone-
tary aggregates within the long-term
range.
The growth targets for the monetary
aggregates projected for the year ending
in the second quarter of 1978 are prob-
Table C.
Recent Trends in Monetary Aggregate 1
Last Last Last Last
Category October BWeeks 13 Weeks 26 Weeks 52 Weeks,
Money Supply
(Week ending Oct. 19, 1977)
M'l 8.8 10.2 9.2 8.9 7.7
M'2 84 8.9 8.9 9.3 10.4
Nonborrowed Heserves"
(Week ending Oct. 26, 1977) -5.1 1.8 -5.0 0.3 0.7
Monetary Base
(Week ending Oct. 26, 1977) 10.2 10.2 10.6 8.1 8.8
Adjusted Federal Heserve Credit
(Week ending Oct. 26, 1977) 13.2 12.1 11.6 10.5 9.7
1 Percent change, simple annual rates. a-week average ending on dale indicated !rom a-week average ending ante earlier period.




•• 'Unadjusted for changes in reserve requirements.
Soun:e: Data Resources, Inc.
d)() low, Given the prospective ex-
2'-.;9:-., in GNP (in 1977 dollars) through
78, the Federal Reserve's money
rates would require another large
-== in income velocity (GNP -7- by
is requirement is unlikely to be
=Or example, in 1976, velocity rose
=. percent-far above the 3.7 percent
in 1975 and also well above the
=8 annual gain of roughly 2,7 per-
ich occurred during the last dec-
- -0 a considerable extent, the sharp
elocity in 1976 is traceable to the
-- ""switch of funds from demand bal-
o interest-bearing accounts. It is
Iy a reflection of technological
-~ ..~ that have been underway for
years-which enable businesses
eholds to be more efficient in
--=r=_-;"'~ their money balances.
- - .JRI forecast suggests that GNP
=- ~ age $2,060.4 billion in the see-
_~rter of 1978-compared with
billion in the same period last
- e fi9Wes for the money supply
- each of these quarters are $321.1
and $342,8 billion, respectively,
me velocity was 5,82 in the
second quarter of 1977,and it may climb
to 6.01 in the second quarter of 1978.This
would represent an annual rate of growth
of 3.3 percent
The advance in velocity implied by the
Federal Reserve's money growth targets
are: 6.5 percent for the bottom of the M 1
range; 5.2 percent for the mid-point, and
4,0 percent for the top of the range. In
each case, the implied rate of increase is
well above the long-term trend of less
than 3,0 percent
Judged in terms of the demand for
money to finance the expansion of eco-
nomic activity- in the face of a further
rise in the general price level-the Fed-
eral Reserve's money growth targets also
seem inadequate, For example, if real
GNP rises by about 4.2 percent in the 12
months ending in mid-1978-and if the
GNP implicit price deflator climbs by 5,7
percent, the total demand for money
might grow by 10 to 11 percent This fig-
ure might be partly offset by an increase
in velocity- perhaps in the neighborhood
of ,3 percent Nevertheless, these pros-
pects sti II suggest that the money stock
might need to expand by 7 to 8 percent
through mid-1978, Even if the Federal Re- 11
serve succeeds in getting the money
stock to grow by the amount implied by
the figure at the top of the M 1 range, it
might still fall short of meeting the econ-
omy's needs,
Moreover, the Federal Reserve has
stressed that its long-run objective is to
reduce the growth rate of the monetary
aggregates to a pace consistent with
price stability,
The above analysis has been cast in
the framework of the prospective be-
havior of the money supply because the
Federal Reserveformulates its own mone-
tary policy objectives in those terms, But
however one chooses to express mone-
tary goals, the economy will need more
stimulus during 1978, Some of it should
come through an accommodating mone-
tary policy,
I believe fiscal policy should make a
contribution to assuring that economic
expansion does not subside during 1978,
For this reason, I would support a tax re-
duction in the range of $20 to $23 billion
this year, A division of $13 to $15 billion
for individuals and $7 to $8 billion for
business would be appropriate. Equally
important is the timing of the decrease,
which ought to come before the end of the
summer if it is to have a significant im-
pact before the end of the year, I can ap-
preciate theCarterAdministration's strong
desire to achieve meaningful tax reform,
and it is clearly hopeful of making the tax
cut dependent on such reform. However,
I doubt that any tax reformwould be pos-
sible in a shrinking economy, Conse-
quently, a tax cut is necessary to assure
continued economic expansion, and
should come in a timely fashion. 0
Andrew Brimmer, formerly a member of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, is now
president of Brimmer & Company, Inc., an economic
and financial consulting firm based in Washington,
D. C. He spoke recently on monetary policy and
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